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KWAM 1 AND THE ‘ULTIMATE’ MISBEHAVIOUR

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By Onikepo Braithwaite

Introduction
The ugly incident that occurred between the musician, Wasiu Ayinde Anifowoshe aka KWAM 1/K1 de Ultimate and Valuejet Airline, its Staff and aviation security personnel last week, is rather unfortunate. KWAM 1 claims that the contents of his flask which was the subject of the dispute, was water. If it was, why was it required? The first thing that you are served once you board Valuejet, even before the aircraft takes off, at least in Premium or Business Class, which I would imagine was what KWAM 1 was travelling, is water – any quantity you require. The truth is that, had KWAM 1 been at Heathrow Airport, London, or Dulles Airport, Washington DC, he could never have tried what he did at Abuja Airport. He would have been arrested.

So, it was a matter of bemusement, amazement and bewilderment, watching the videos of how the KWAM 1 incident was at sixes and sevens, with ground staff pleading and talking to KWAM 1 on the tarmac, where he shouldn’t have been, in the first place. He should have been bundled away by ground staff/security, for his own safety and that of others. They were obviously ‘star struck’ or acting under the fear of ‘Bigmanism’, because, if that was you or me, we would almost certainly have been bundled away from the tarmac, had we refused to follow instructions. KWAM 1 even had his hand on the aircraft as if it was a motor vehicle, while he was trying to call someone in authority to ensure that he got on the flight, regardless of whether or not he was breaching aviation rules. The errors/inaction of the ground staff, led to the the somewhat bad ending of the incident. Do our airport personnel, even undergo proper training in international best practices at all? Surely, safety protocols on an airport tarmac should be strictly adhered to, with absolutely no exceptions.

KWAM 1: Matters Arising
1) The Over-100ml Flask
KWAM 1 appeared to be the cause of the ensuing altercation, between himself and airport ground staff/crew of Valuejet Airline.

He was said to have attempted to board a Valuejet aircraft bound for Lagos from Abuja, with a flask which was not only bigger than 100ml, but opaque (allegedly containing an alcoholic beverage), contrary to aviation rules which require that any liquid to be carried on board an aircraft mustn’t exceed 100ml, and must be clearly displayed for inspection by aviation security officers or any other authorised person on demand. KWAM 1 was also alleged to have assaulted Valuejet Staff, by splashing the contents of his flask on them. One even wonders how he got that far, to the foot of the aircraft with the offending flask in hand. See the Nigerian Civil Aviation Security Programme and Annex 17 particularly Article 4.4 (Measures relating to passengers and their cabin baggage) to the Convention on International Civil Aviation Tenth Edition of 2017 (ICAO) & Section 45 (1)-(3) of the Civil Aviation Act 2022 (CAA).

ICAO recognises the airlines’ duty to protect their passengers, and obviously, this is done by proper screening of passengers, their cabin baggage, and even the luggage that goes into the hold of the aircraft.

In the first place, KWAM 1 had no right to refuse to submit the offending flask for whatever inspection was required. Section 84 of the CAA recognises the fact that it is possible to carry a toxic substance onto an aircraft, which could prove to be a danger to passengers. Also see Section 35(1)(c) of the Terrorism (Prevention and Prohibition) Act 2022 (TPPA). Although the TPPA has similar or corresponding offences as the CAA with regard to aviation offences, it is obvious that this whole KWAM 1 fiasco had nothing to do with terrorism, but was a case of Bigmanism gone wrong. For instance, radioactive material could be in liquid form; it is hazardous to the health of people if they are exposed to it, while flammable liquids that can damage or destroy an aircraft and everyone on it, or prevent it from flying, are dangerous liquids that terrorists could attempt to sneak on board an aircraft. By virtue of Section 84(1)(c) of the CAA, a person convicted of placing dangerous substances on an aircraft which results in damaging or destroying it, or prevents it from flying, is liable to life imprisonment with no option of fine. It therefore, shows how important it is to adhere to the rules concerning screening of passengers, to prevent harmful things from making their way into an aircraft to cause havoc.

2) Assault
In Lawal v State (2010) LPELR-4622(CA) per Joseph Shagbaor Ikyegh, JCA, the Court of Appeal used the definition of assault in Section 15 of the Robbery and Firearms Act thus: “…striking, touching, moving or otherwise applying force, including heat, light, electrical force, gas, odour, or any other substance or thing whatever, if applied in such a degree as to cause injury or personal discomfort to the person of another, either directly or indirectly without his consent….”. KWAM 1 was seen to not only be in a heated argument with the airline staff, intimidating them with “do you know I am?”, but, he was also alleged to have splashed the contents of his flask on the ground staff and even Captain Ogoyi who had disembarked to de-escalate the tension, thereby causing them personal discomfort. See Section 264-265 of the Penal Code Act 1960 (PCA) on assault, and the punishment of one year imprisonment or a fine or both upon conviction.

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3) Trespass and Nuisance
KWAM 1 also trespassed on the tarmac, contrary to Section 75(1) of the CAA, a misdemeanour that carries upon conviction, punishment of a fine of at least N500,000 or 6 months imprisonment or both. He stood in front of the Valuejet aircraft, obstructing it, in a bid to prevent it from moving (we don’t know if the Pilots were able to see this from the cockpit). This kind of nuisance or trespass is also contrary to Sections 473 and 459B of the PCA and Criminal Code Act (CCA) respectively, and attracts a punishment of 3 months imprisonment upon conviction under both laws and/or an unspecified fine under the PCA or N40 fine under the CCA. Additionally, Sections 472 and 459A of the PCA and CCA respectively, prohibit any person, inter alia, from obstructing, hindering or impeding the movement of an aircraft which is in motion; such a person is guilty of a misdemeanour and is liable upon conviction to 2 years imprisonment under both laws, or a fine or both under the PCA .

4) Hijacking
Be that as it may, KWAM 1’s actions do not fall within the purview of hijacking an aircraft as many have labelled his actions, at least, not within the provisions of Section 83(1) of the CAA, which provides inter alia that the offender must be ‘onboard’ the aircraft in service, to commit the offence of hijacking by threatening to or seizing control of it. KWAM 1 wasn’t onboard the Valuejet aircraft, he was clearly outside it. Again, Section 34 of the TPPA requires an offender to be on board an aircraft which is in flight, seizing control or exercising control over it, to qualify as the offence of hijacking, which upon conviction, attracts life imprisonment, and also a N25 million fine by virtue of Section 83(1) of the CAA. Take Singapore’s Hijacking of Aircraft and Protection of Aircraft and International Airports Act 1978 (revised in 1996)(HAPAA), in Section 2(2)(a), it defines the period when an aircraft is in flight, inter alia, as from when its doors are closed following embarkation until when they are opened for disembarkation. But, just like the CAA, Section 3(1) of the HAPA also provides that the hijacker must be onboard the aircraft.

Remember the 1993 Nigerian aircraft hijack case? When 4 Youths, Richard Ogunderu, Kabir Adenuga, Benneth Oluwadaisi and Kenny Rasaq-Lawal, hijacked an Abuja bound Nigeria Airways flight, which they planned to divert to Frankfurt, Germany. Their demand was that Military Head of State, General Ibrahim Babangida, GCFR, resign and handover to Chief MKO Abiola, GCFR, or they would set the aircraft ablaze in 72 hours. The plane had to stop in Niamey, Niger Republic to refuel. There were 149 people aboard, 138 passengers and 11 crew members. After initial negotiations, 129 hostages were freed. Eventually, Niger Gendarmes stormed the aircraft. A female crew member lost her life during the rescue operation, while one of the hijackers was injured. The hijackers were tried and convicted in Niger, where they served out their prison sentences.

Unlike KWAM 1, the hijackers were on board the Nigeria Airways flight; they seized control of the aircraft, altered its course, diverting it from going to Abuja and instead, taking it to Niamey. They also made demands, and threatened consequences if they weren’t met. Their actions fell within Sections 83(1) of the CAA and Section 34 of the TPPA. See the case of R v Abdul Hussain [1999] Crim LR 570 where the Defendants hijacked a plane going from Sudan to Jordan, and diverted it to London. They were found guilty of hijacking a plane, contrary to Section 1 of the Aviation Security Act 1982. Their appeals were however, subsequently allowed.

Captain Oluranti Ogoyi & First Officer Ivan Iloba
Section 84(3)(a) of the CAA makes it an offence for anyone using a device to commit an act of violence against another at an aerodrome, which is likely to cause serious injury or death to another. The punishment for this under the CAA upon conviction, is a fine of at least N2 million or imprisonment of at least 5 years. Some have argued that this is what the Pilots of Valuejet did to KWAM 1, as they started taxiing on the runway while he and the ground staff were still standing and arguing by the aircraft. They believe that Captain Ogoyi couldn’t have got clearance from the Marshaller to move, when there was a commotion still going on by the aircraft. How do they know that, for a fact? Was the Control Tower, aware of the disturbance outside the aircraft? They could have cleared Captain Ogoyi, for takeoff. The investigation will reveal the response to this.

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Though, all reasonable people believe that the aircraft should not have moved with the commotion still going on around it, one cannot conclude that Captain Ogoyi intended to physically hurt KWAM 1 or anyone else, as such conclusion doesn’t make sense. KWAM 1 was in the midst of airport staff, standing quite close to each other, and he certainly wouldn’t have been the only casualty. Again, why would the Pilots want to hurt or kill fellow Valuejet staff or airport security, by running into them with the aircraft?

Someone asked if provocation could be a viable defence for the Pilots. In Sunday Jackson v State (2025) LPELR-80692(SC) per Mohammed Baba Idris JSC, the Supreme Court held that the plea of provocation wasn’t exculpatory, and was only a mitigating defence that could reduce punishment from murder to manslaughter. Provocation involves a loss of self control, based on the action of the adversary. Loss of self control, is certainly not expected from a Pilot-in-Command or any Pilot for that matter, while it is unlikely that any reasonable person would lose their self control, based on an issue such as that of KWAM 1 and his Bigmanism at the airport that day. Pilots are trained to manage stress, and make unimpeachable decisions, even under stress; they are also trained, to manage their emotions.

So, what could it have been?

Have we considered the most valid defence? That Pilots have a limited amount of visibility directly under the aircraft when they are taxiing, because of the aircraft design, the height of the cockpit and their position of sitting in the aircraft? And, this is why when Pilots start to taxi, they do so at a slow speed until they reach the deserted area, the runway, to take off. This allows them to minimise risks and react, if the need arises. This appears to be a more reasonable and tenable explanation of what happened, on the part of Captain Ogoyi and FO Iloba. That maybe the Pilots, couldn’t see under the plane. In any event, no rational person would remain beneath or by an aircraft, after the doors have been shut for take off.

Conclusion
KWAM 1 rendered a public apology, for his ‘ultimate’ misbehaviour, particularly as a titled Chief of Ijebuland. His predecessor-in-title, Otunba Michael Olasubomi Balogun, CON, the former Olori Òmò Òba Akilè Ijebu, would certainly not have been caught dead in that kind of public altercation with anyone; he comported himself with the dignity that his title required. And, if the late Awujalè of Ijebuland, Oba S. K. Adetona, GCON, for reasons best known to himself, had conferred KWAM 1 with Otunba Balogun’s title even before his burial, to the chagrin of some Ijebuites, KWAM 1 has succeeded in somewhat ridiculing the confidence reposed in him by the late Awujalè, less than a month after his death, with his reprehensible behaviour.

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KWAM 1’s apology was probably insincere but necessary, since he had behaved odiously, and this had resulted in his condemnation by some right thinking members of the public. The statement of the Minister of Aviation, Festus Keyamo, SAN, showing that what is good for the goose, is also good for the gander, would have also been a motivating factor for his hollow show of remorse. If the Pilots were suspended pending the outcome of the investigation, KWAM 1 has also received no-fly punishment from the Minister.

For those who have condemned the Pilots without hearing the outcome of the investigation, they are pre-empting the investigation, and drawing conclusions without all the facts. Let’s wait and see what happens.

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THE UNCOMMON FEAT: WHY TINUBU’S STATE POLICE REFORM IS THE ANTIDOTE TO DECADES OF INSECURITY

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By Oto’ Drama, PhD.

FOR decades, the discourse on Nigeria’s security architecture has been trapped in a centralized bottleneck—a stranger-policing model where officers are often deployed to terrains they do not understand and cultures they do not share.

Today, that cycle is breaking. By activating the transition to State Police, President Bola Ahmed Tinubu is not merely fulfilling a campaign promise; he is steering the nation toward a techno-sovereign reality where security is as local as the threats it seeks to eliminate.

This uncommon feat by the President and the Inspector General of Police (IGP), Tunji Disu, deserves more than just applause—it requires a rigorous intellectual and technological blueprint to ensure it becomes the cornerstone of a new Nigerian regionalism.

The Logic of the Local: Why State Police is the Only Way Forward
The fundamental maxim of modern governance is that all politics is local, but security is even more so. In every hamlet, village, and urban ward, the residents know the visitors, the anomalies, and the shadows. A federal officer from a thousand miles away cannot navigate the intricate social fabric of a community as effectively as a son or daughter of that soil.

While critics fear the political manipulation of state police by governors, this concern—though valid—is outweighed by the catastrophic cost of the status quo. Centralization has not prevented abuse; it has only facilitated inefficiency. By shifting to a subnational model, we introduce proximity as a deterrent. When the police are part of the community, the social contract is renewed, and the wall of silence that often protects bandits and kidnappers begins to crumble.

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To transition from a “force” to a “service,” Nigeria must adopt the tactics of the world’s most efficiently policed nations. These countries balance local autonomy with high-technology integration. For President Tinubu and IGP Disu to truly “reclaim the killing fields,” the new state police must not just be “men in uniforms” but nodes in a digital security grid.

Here are three world-class tactics to curtail insecurity.
Nigeria’s forests have become “blind spots.” State police should be equipped with long-range thermal drones integrated with geotagging software. This allows local units to map “heat signatures” in dense foliage, identifying kidnappers’ camps with surgical precision before a single boot hits the ground.

Secondly, is Bio-Digital Border & Community DNA.
Instead of static checkpoints, state police should utilize biometric mobile units. By enrolling local populations into a decentralized database, “strangers” or “infiltrators” in a locality are immediately flagged during routine community patrols. This is the ultimate Bio-Digital Bastion.

Thirdly, is Professional Neutrality via Federal Oversight. To prevent the feared “governor’s militia” syndrome, Nigeria should adopt the German Model:
State Operational Autonomy: States control recruitment, localized patrolling, and community intelligence. A “National Police Service Commission” (NPSC) must set the bar for training, weapon handling, and forensic standards, with the power to decertify any state unit that violates human rights or democratic norms.

The inauguration of the 8-member steering committee by IGP Disu is the first step in a marathon. We must encourage this administration to remain indomitable. The transition to state police is not just a return to regionalism; it is a return to common sense.

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By empowering the states to secure their own lands, President Tinubu is providing the antidote to insecurity. It is time to move past the fear of abuse and embrace the power of localized, intelligent, and technologically-driven protection. Nigeria’s sovereignty starts at the grassroots.

Dr. Drama, PhD Counterterrorism contributed this piece via: Nigeriandrama@gmail.com

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DANIEL BWALA’S AL JAZEERA HUMILIATION +(VIDEO)

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By Farooq A. Kperogi

I barely know Daniel Bwala. He came to the forefront of national media attention in 2022 because of his impassioned opposition to the choice of Kashim Shettima as Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s running mate. But beyond his public break from the APC, he came across to me as a voluble, ignorant and opportunistic careerist, not because of his stance on Tinubu’s choice of a Muslim running mate, but because of what struck me as his facileness and self-seeking obsessions.

His dramatic volte-face from being a virulent Tinubu critic to a fawning, vicious Tinubu battering ram has proven that my hunch about him was accurate.

Yet I felt sorry watching him eaten alive by Mehdi Hassan on Al Jazeera on Friday, March 6. He willingly participated in the detonation of what remained of his credibility before the world. In the process, he did incalculable reputational damage to the Tinubu government he is paid to protect.

What viewers saw on Mehdi Hasan’s Head to Head was the spectacle of a presidential spokesman arriving unarmed to a firefight he should have anticipated, then trying to fight back with nervous laughter, evasions, amnesia and the old Nigerian official fallback of whataboutery.

His evasiveness and prevarications were so unnervingly apparent that Hasan was compelled to say, “At the weekend, you put out a video to music of you and your team researching and prepping for this show and…now every time I ask you say you are not aware of that….what were you researching in that video…?”

The most striking thing about Bwala’s performance was not that he was challenged hard. Anyone who agrees to sit opposite Mehdi Hasan knows the interview will not be a tea party. The disgrace was that Bwala looked startled by facts he should have mastered before stepping into the studio.

On insecurity, on corruption, on Tinubu’s own words and even on his own prior statements, he oscillated between denial, deflection and the sort of desperate verbal stalling that makes a government look smaller than its critics claim it is.

The problem was not that Daniel Bwala appeared lazy or obviously unprepared. In fact, he looked prepared, even thoroughly rehearsed and robotic. He had the posture, the confidence and the choreographed mannerisms of a man who believed he had done his homework. But his carefully planned performances collapsed pitifully when they collided with Hasan’s hard, cold, indisputable facts.

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Political wordplay can sometimes survive on friendly platforms or on Nigeria’s tame media spaces where assertion is mistaken for argument. It cannot survive a fact-driven, scorched-earthed, bare-knuckle, no-holds-barred interrogation.

Facts are facts. And Mehdi Hasan is a man of facts. He has the rare gift of making heavy, devastating facts sound almost light in conversation. That quality made Bwala’s evasions even more painful to watch.

The exchange over “context” illustrated this perfectly. When confronted with evidence that insecurity had worsened under the current administration, Bwala retreated to the mantra that “context matters.” Yet the context he invoked was little more than semantic fog and intentional, self-impressed verbal obfuscation.

Hasan, by contrast, used numbers and reports that any government spokesman worth the title should already know. The moment became absurd when Bwala insisted that the context of worsening statistics was that things were not getting worse. The dialogue is worth reproducing:

Hasan: You are failing. Amnesty International says you are failing at security. The numbers don’t lie.

Bwala: It’s unfortunate and as a government working day and night that situation. I don’t agree to [sic] the fact that it’s getting worse.

Hasan: How can it not get worse if more people die in one year than the previous year?

Bwala: Context matters.

Hasan: What’s the context?

Bwala: The context is not getting worse.

Hasan: What!

Bwala: Yes.

Hasan: The context is not getting worse?

Bwala: The context is that it is not getting worse, because you, you see this is a water [sic], right?….

Forget, for now, Bwala’s inexcusably horrible grammar, especially for a lawyer, his tortured logic and his buffoonish articulation. That was some cringeworthy self-own.


The numbers he tried to wave away are not inventions of hostile foreigners with an anti-Nigerian agenda. Nigeria’s own National Human Rights Commission reported that at least 2,266 people were killed by bandits or insurgents in the first half of 2025 alone.

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Conflict monitoring groups have recorded even higher totals for the full year. Amnesty International has repeatedly warned that violence has intensified since Tinubu assumed office. In other words, Hasan’s central point was merely a summary of documented reality.

This is what made Bwala’s performance so damaging. He was not merely disputing interpretations. He was disputing arithmetic. When a spokesman tells the world that things are not getting worse while credible datasets show that they are, he is insulting the intelligence of everyone listening, especially Nigerians who bury the dead, pay ransoms, withdraw their children from schools and avoid highways after dark.

But the interview’s most morally satisfying feature was Hasan’s methodical dismantling of Bwala’s denials about his own past words. Bwala tried the trite and tired Nigerian political trick of pretending that statements made in opposition exist in a separate moral universe from statements made in office. Hasan did not let him get away with it.

Bwala denied on air having said Tinubu and his camp created a militia and threatened him. Yet those remarks were widely reported during the 2023 campaign. He also denied saying that bullion vans seen at Tinubu’s Bourdillon residence were ostensibly for vote buying, despite the fact that the comments were carried by multiple Nigerian outlets at the time. So, when Bwala asked who said such things, the answer was brutally simple. Daniel Bwala said them.

The same pattern appeared on corruption. Tinubu did in fact proclaim at a public event that Nigeria had “no more corruption,” a line that was widely reported and widely mocked and that provoked Omoyele Sowore to call Tinubu a “criminal” for which he is being tried now.

Bwala’s attempt to rescue the statement by retroactively inventing a narrower meaning was not the contextual clarification he wanted it to be. It was out-and-out mendacity.

On the appointment of Abubakar Bagudu as minister of budget and economic planning, Bwala again reached for evasion. Yet the record is clear that Bagudu returned about $163 million linked to the Abacha loot investigations in a settlement with authorities. Whether or not one calls that a conviction, the public controversy around his appointment cannot honestly be dismissed as drunken rumor.

Then there is the overarching irony that electrified the interview. Bwala was confronted with the fossil record of his own mouth. Before joining Tinubu’s camp, he publicly attacked the same man over allegations of corruption, the drug forfeiture case in the United States and the bullion van episode. What Hasan exposed was the speed with which partisan appetite can digest prior conviction and call the indigestion growth.

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Bwala’s performance mattered for a reason larger than one man’s embarrassment. It showed in concentrated form the disease afflicting Nigerian political communication.

Too many spokesmen believe their job is not to illuminate but to survive the segment. So, they deny what is documented, nervously laugh when cornered, compare Nigeria with unrelated countries, abuse the word “context” and hope that shamelessness can do the work preparation cannot.

Daniel Bwala went to London to defend the government. Instead, he displayed its worst habits: contempt for evidence, indifference to contradiction and the assumption that public memory is so short that a man can disown his own recorded words without consequence.

Mehdi Hasan did not disgrace him. Bwala did that himself. Hasan merely kept the receipts.

Kperogi holds a Ph.D. in Public Communication from Georgia State University (2011), an M.Sc. in Communication from the University of Louisiana at Lafayette, and a B.A. in Mass Communication from Bayero University, Kano . He began his career as a journalist and news editor for Nigerian newspapers including the Daily Trust and the now-defunct New Nigerian . He also worked as a researcher and speechwriter in President Olusegun Obasanjo’s administration from 2002 to 2004 . Kperogi writes a popular weekly political column, “Notes from Atlanta,” which currently appears in the Nigerian Tribune, and a language column, “Politics of Grammar” . He has authored several academic books, including “Glocal English: The Changing Face and Forms of Nigerian English in a Global World” (2015) and “Nigeria’s Digital Diaspora: Citizen Media, Democracy, and Participation” (2020), which won the 2021 CHOICE Outstanding Academic Title Award

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DSS, THE WALIDA ABDULLAHI EPISODE, AND THE QUIET LEADERSHIP OF DG ADEOLA OLUWATOSIN AJAYI- OLUMIDE BAJULAIYE

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The Department of State Services (DSS), also known as the State Security Service (SSS), remains one of the most misunderstood institutions within Nigeria’s security architecture.

For many Nigerians, the agency only comes into public focus during dramatic arrests or when politics dominates the conversation. Yet intelligence work is far deeper and far more complex than the moments that make the headlines.
At its core, the DSS is Nigeria’s primary domestic intelligence service. Its duty is not simply to arrest suspects but to prevent threats before they escalate into national crises. Terror networks, espionage activities, sabotage against government institutions, and plots capable of destabilising the country all fall within its operational radar.

Like many institutions in Nigeria, the DSS has faced its share of criticism. There have been allegations of political interference, controversial arrests and occasional heavy-handed operations. Such scrutiny is normal in a democracy where powerful institutions are expected to remain accountable.

However, the other side of the story—often overlooked—is the critical role intelligence plays in keeping the country stable.
Intelligence successes rarely trend on social media because when intelligence works, crises are prevented before they occur. And “nothing happened today” rarely qualifies as breaking news.

Over the years, the DSS has helped disrupt terror financing networks, track extremist recruiters and intercept plots that could have resulted in major national security incidents. The agency has also provided intelligence support in the fight against insurgent groups such as Boko Haram, assisting security forces in anticipating threats.

Under the leadership of the current Director-General, Adeola Oluwatosin Ajayi, observers say the agency has focused increasingly on preventive intelligence, institutional reforms and improved collaboration with other security agencies.
Ajayi’s tenure has been associated with strengthening intelligence coordination among security institutions and placing greater emphasis on professionalism and lawful operations. Security analysts say the DSS has intensified efforts against kidnapping networks, arms trafficking rings and organised criminal syndicates threatening national security.

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Another area where the current leadership has drawn attention is the effort to rebuild public confidence in the agency. In recent years, the DSS has demonstrated a willingness to review controversial cases, comply with court processes and engage more openly with stakeholders, including the media.
The recent episode involving Walida Abdullahi also illustrates the delicate balance intelligence agencies must maintain between national security responsibilities and public perception.

While details surrounding the matter sparked debate in public spaces, it also underscored how intelligence operations—often conducted quietly and based on sensitive information—can quickly become subjects of political or social interpretation once they enter the public domain.
For the DSS leadership, such situations represent the difficult terrain intelligence institutions must navigate: acting decisively when national security concerns arise while ensuring that operations remain within legal and professional boundaries.
Observers argue that the measured handling of such sensitive matters reflects the broader leadership approach of Ajayi—one that prioritises caution, institutional discipline and strategic restraint rather than dramatic publicity.

Beyond operational issues, the DSS under Ajayi has also sought to improve engagement with the media and civil society, a move many believe is necessary in building transparency without compromising intelligence confidentiality.
Ultimately, intelligence work remains one of the most paradoxical professions in public service.
When intelligence agencies succeed, the public rarely notices because crises are prevented before they happen. But when something goes wrong—or even appears controversial—everyone suddenly becomes an expert.

The DSS, like every intelligence service in the world, will continue to face criticism and scrutiny. That is part of democratic accountability.
Yet beyond the noise of politics and public perception, the agency remains a critical pillar in Nigeria’s internal security structure—often working quietly while the public sees only fragments of its work.

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And if the current trajectory continues, the story of the DSS under DG Oluwatosin Ajayi may ultimately be defined not by the controversies that occasionally make headlines, but by the threats that never materialise.

Olumide Bajulaiye is the Publisher, Daily Dispatch Newspaper, writes from Abuja.

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