WHY THE LOKOJA COURT MAY HAVE BEEN WRONG TO SET ASIDE THE NDC JUDGMENT OF 2025

By Dr. M.O. Ubani, SAN

A recent opinion published in The Whistler by my learned friend, Charles Udeh, Esq., applauded the decision of the Federal High Court sitting in Lokoja to set aside its earlier judgment directing the registration of the National Democratic Coalition (NDC) as a political party. The author argued that the earlier judgment was liable to be nullified because the Prominent Movement Party (PMP), whose logo was allegedly similar to that of the NDC, was not joined as a party to the proceedings. He further contended that the decision was justified on grounds of fair hearing and the need to avoid prejudice to an interested party.

While the concerns raised regarding fair hearing deserve serious consideration, the conclusion that the Lokoja Court was unquestionably right to revisit and nullify its earlier final judgment is, with respect, open to substantial legal challenge.

The first and perhaps most fundamental issue is the doctrine of functus officio. The law is settled that once a court has delivered a final judgment on the merits of a matter, it becomes functus officio and lacks jurisdiction to revisit the substance of that judgment except in very limited circumstances, such as correcting clerical mistakes, accidental slips, or where the judgment is shown to be a nullity.

In Adegoke Motors Ltd. v. Adesanya (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 109) 250, the Supreme Court emphatically held that a court cannot sit on appeal over its own final decision. Once judgment has been entered, the trial court’s jurisdiction over the matter is exhausted.

The critical question, therefore, is whether the December 2025 judgment directing INEC to register the NDC was a final judgment on the merits. If it was, then the court could only revisit it if the judgment was shown to be a nullity. Mere disagreement with the decision or dissatisfaction by an affected third party cannot automatically revive the court’s jurisdiction. The proper avenue in such circumstances is ordinarily an appeal.

The principal foundation of the argument supporting the court’s decision is that PMP was not joined in the proceedings despite allegedly having an interest in the dispute concerning party logos. However, Nigerian procedural law has long rejected the proposition that every instance of non-joinder automatically renders proceedings a nullity.

Order 13 of the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules embodies the settled principle that no cause or matter shall be defeated merely by reason of misjoinder or non-joinder of parties. In Green v. Green (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt. 61) 480, the Supreme Court held that non-joinder does not necessarily invalidate proceedings where the court is otherwise able to effectively determine the issues before it. Likewise, in Peenok Investments Ltd. v. Hotel Presidential Ltd. (1982) 12 SC 1, the Supreme Court emphasized that the court’s focus should be on whether the issues can be effectively and completely determined between the parties before it.

The relevant inquiry, therefore, is not simply whether PMP ought to have been joined. The real question is whether the absence of PMP deprived the court of jurisdiction or made it impossible for the court to adjudicate upon the dispute between NDC and INEC.

If the primary issue before the court was whether INEC unlawfully refused registration of NDC, then it is arguable that the dispute could be resolved without necessarily making PMP a party.

There is a crucial distinction in law between a judgment that is wrong and a judgment that is a nullity. An erroneous judgment remains binding and enforceable until set aside on appeal. A null judgment, on the other hand, is void ab initio because the court lacked jurisdiction or because there was a fundamental defect that rendered the proceedings incompetent.

The Supreme Court has consistently maintained this distinction. In First Bank of Nigeria Plc v. TSA Industries Ltd. (2010) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1216) 247, the Court reaffirmed that a final judgment remains valid and binding unless overturned by a competent appellate court.

Consequently, even if one assumes that the Lokoja Court erred in failing to join PMP, such an error would not automatically transform the judgment into a nullity. At best, it may constitute a ground of appeal.

Those who support the setting aside of the judgment invoke Section 36 of the Constitution and the right to fair hearing. Fair hearing is undoubtedly a cardinal constitutional principle. However, it must be balanced against another equally important principle, which is the finality of litigation.

The administration of justice would descend into uncertainty if every person who later claims to be affected by a judgment could return to the same court and invite it to reopen concluded proceedings. The Supreme Court has repeatedly warned against such an approach because it undermines public confidence in judicial decisions and erodes the certainty that final judgments are intended to provide. Indeed, the law’s insistence on appeals as the proper corrective mechanism is itself designed to preserve both fairness and finality.

Another issue deserving consideration is whether PMP’s grievance should have been ventilated through appellate proceedings rather than through an application inviting the trial court to set aside its own judgment.

The Supreme Court has recognised that a person directly affected by a judgment may, in exceptional circumstances, apply to have it set aside. However, such relief is ordinarily reserved for situations where the judgment is shown to be fundamentally defective or void. Authorities such as Obimonure v. Erinosho (1966) 1 All NLR 250 and Alor v. Ngene (2007) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1062) 163 demonstrate that such intervention remains exceptional and not routine.

The burden, therefore, rested heavily on the applicant to establish not merely prejudice, but a jurisdictional defect sufficient to render the earlier judgment a nullity.

Beyond the strict legal arguments surrounding functus officio, non-joinder, and fair hearing, there is an equally important consideration which the court ought to have taken into account before setting aside its earlier judgment: the spirit and objectives of Nigeria’s electoral jurisprudence.

The Electoral Act was enacted not merely to regulate elections but also to promote political participation, electoral certainty, democratic inclusiveness, and stability in the electoral process.

Courts have consistently recognised that election-related disputes should be resolved in a manner that advances, rather than undermines, democratic governance.

At the time the judgment was set aside, the National Democratic Coalition (NDC) had already acquired legal recognition pursuant to the court’s earlier judgment and INEC’s consequent compliance therewith. The party had reportedly undertaken nationwide membership registration, submitted its membership register to INEC, established party structures across the country, conducted congresses and primaries, and produced candidates for forthcoming off-cycle elections as well as preparations for the 2027 general elections.

These developments were neither speculative nor contingent. They represented accrued rights and legitimate expectations arising from a subsisting judgment of a competent court and actions taken in reliance upon that judgment.

The court ought to have considered the far-reaching consequences of its decision on thousands of party members, aspirants, candidates, supporters, and stakeholders who had acted in good faith on the strength of the earlier judgment. The law does not operate in a vacuum. Judicial decisions, particularly in electoral matters, must take account of their practical effect on democratic institutions and political stability.

A situation where a political party, having been registered pursuant to a court order, has gone ahead to organise itself, recruit members, conduct primaries and produce candidates, only for the same court to subsequently nullify the foundation upon which those activities were undertaken, creates uncertainty and instability in the electoral process.

Such an outcome risks disenfranchising not only the party but also the citizens who have chosen to associate with it and contest elections under its platform.

It is noteworthy that the applicant seeking the setting aside of the judgment had not acquired a comparable legal status or democratic stake in the process. Yet the court appeared prepared to sacrifice the accrued interests of an already registered political party and its supporters in favour of a party that INEC is yet to register. Whether this outcome accords with substantial justice is a legitimate question.

The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasised that the law should not be interpreted in a manner that defeats substantial justice or produces manifest absurdity. Electoral jurisprudence, in particular, should encourage certainty, predictability, and confidence in democratic institutions.

The implications of this ruling extend beyond the NDC. If allowed to stand as a precedent, it may create a dangerous situation where political parties, candidates, and voters can no longer confidently rely on final judicial pronouncements. Such uncertainty is inimical to democratic development and may discourage political participation by emerging political groups seeking lawful access to the electoral space.

With tremendous respect to the learned trial Judge, the decision appears to have paid insufficient attention to the broader democratic consequences of setting aside a judgment that had already produced extensive legal, political, and electoral consequences. Courts must remain vigilant not only in protecting procedural fairness but also in safeguarding the stability, certainty, and integrity of the democratic process.

In a constitutional democracy that is still evolving, judicial decisions should strengthen democratic institutions and public confidence in the electoral system. Any decision capable of unsettling an entire political party, its candidates, and its supporters after substantial reliance has been placed on a subsisting judgment must be approached with the utmost caution. Failure to do so risks creating uncertainty that is not only legally problematic but potentially injurious to the health of Nigeria’s democracy.

The debate surrounding the Lokoja Court’s decision is far from settled. While concerns about fair hearing and procedural justice are legitimate, it is respectfully submitted that the opposing view overstates the legal consequences of non-joinder and understates the significance of the doctrine of functus officio.

The more compelling legal position appears to be that if the earlier judgment was indeed a final judgment on the merits which I believe it is, the trial court had exhausted its jurisdiction and could not ordinarily reopen the matter except upon proof of a fundamental nullity which in the present circumstance does not exist.

Equally important is the fact that the setting aside of the judgment appears not to have sufficiently accounted for the practical realities created by the earlier decision. By the time the judgment was nullified, a political party had already emerged through legal recognition of INEC, mobilised members nationwide, conducted congresses and primaries, and produced candidates in preparation for off-cycle elections and the 2027 general elections. These are not insignificant developments that can be ignored without profound consequences for democratic participation and electoral certainty.

Whether the failure to join PMP reached the threshold of a jurisdictional defect capable of nullifying the earlier judgment remains a question that will ultimately require authoritative determination by the Court of Appeal or, eventually, the Supreme Court.

Until then, it is difficult to conclude with certainty that the Lokoja Court was right to set aside its own final judgment. There are substantial legal grounds for the contrary view. More importantly, there are compelling constitutional and democratic considerations which suggest that the court ought to have exercised greater restraint before making a decision capable of unsettling accrued rights, legitimate expectations, and the political aspirations of thousands of Nigerians who had acted in reliance on a subsisting judgment of a competent court.

The law must protect fair hearing, but it must also protect certainty, stability, and democratic participation. A balance that sacrifices the latter at the altar of an expansive interpretation of non-joinder risks creating a precedent that may ultimately weaken rather than strengthen Nigeria’s constitutional democracy.

Dr. M.O. Ubani, SAN

Legal Practitioner and Policy Analyst